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CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC ONUS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE: THE INCREASING NEED FOR 
DETERRING CHINA’S AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SENKAKU 
ISLANDS
This paper will focus on the “demographic onus effect” to challenge 
established cognitions of rising China. The country’s demographic 
dynamics, especially the trade-off between a military build-up and 
welfare spending, will most probably lead to what might be called a 
“geriatric peace” by around 2030. This is because, due to its long-
time one child policy, China is set to confront an unprecedented 
ageing population before becoming an advanced industrial country. 
Until then, however, the Chinese will have the fiscal wherewithal to 
continue the country’s formidable military accrual. China is also 
likely to become far more belligerent by manipulating nationalist 
sentiments at home, alongside using foreign policy to divert growing 
popular discontent. This paper will analyze China’s demographic 
dynamics and explore the implications of the ageing population to 
Japan’s security, with the focus on a possible contingency over the 
Senkaku Islands as the most likely flash point. It will conclude with 
policy recommendations for Japan and the U.S. to weather possible 
China’s bellicosity during the next ten to fifteen years.  
Keywords: demographic onus, geriatric peace, China, Japan-U.S. alliance, 
Senkaku Islands, regime survival, a small war.
Introduction
China’s two-decade long rise involving U.S. relative decline is now a focal 
point in the ongoing debate on a new world order after hegemony. A recent U.S. 
National Intelligence Council publication, Global World in 2030: Alternative 
Worlds, has added fuel to the debate, arguing that “by 2030, no country—
whether the U.S., China, or any other large country—will be a hegemonic 
power.”1 The author of this article, who wrote a paper in 2007 as a visiting Japan 
fellow-in-residence at the Brookings Institution, also assumed the inexorable 
aggrandizement of China’s economic power involving considerable military 
buildup to be sustained in the foreseeable future.2 As of summer 2013, Matake 
Kamiya, professor at Japan’s National Defense Academy, remains certain 
of the continuing tenability of the assumption in his paper on the evolving 
East Asian order in a mainstream journal published by the Japan Institute of 
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International Affairs, a de facto research arm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.3 
These publications are indicative of the considerable permeation of “China’s 
continuing rise” into the U.S. and the Japanese epistemic communities.
Looking closely, however, the cognized status of China as a regional 
hegemon in the making is based on the simple long-term extrapolation of 
the statistical trend of its double-digit economic growth rates for the last two 
decade. Yet, there is no major historical precedent to substantiate the validity 
of such far-reaching extrapolation. The extrapolation will most probably be 
untenable because, even by mobilizing additional resource inputs, a developing 
economy will inevitably confront a series of socio-economic structural 
bottlenecks that prevent it from growing further or will simply undergo 
diminishing marginal effect of the inputs on growth. (In fact, the Chinese 
economy may have already confronted such bottleneck, as demonstrated by its 
inability to sustain minimum 8% annual economic growth rate that is generally 
considered essential to maintain sufficient employment and social stability.4) 
In addition, economic growth will not necessarily be translated into military 
capability due to technical and organizational impediments inherent in building 
advanced Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) organizations and systems as well 
as hardware technologies and human resources.5 Arguably, there is no solid 
ground to predict the eventual emergence of a Chinese regional hegemon.
Now, a Japanese policy intellectual, Toshiya Tsugami, cogently argues, 
with ample statistical data, that the established cognition of China’s continuing 
rise is not only Chinese mirage but also our delusion: it is very difficult for 
China to achieve even 5% annual growth rates, given that it has already entered 
a moderate growth rate period. He then contends that the country now faces 
a bleak future, and that its GDP will never be the world’s No. 1.6 Some major 
Japanese economists have recently become increasingly aware of demographic 
pressure resulting from rapid greying concurrent with low fertility as a key long-
term driver of Japan’s protracted socio-economic stagnation,7 known as “the 
lost two-decades”,8 and Tsugami has aptly applied this approach to China that 
carried out the stringent enforcement of one-child policy for several decades. 
Certainly, his analysis shares many similarities with the existing literature 
in English on China’s demographic change.9 To note, however, his major 
contribution lies in schematically highlighting the significant time lag between 
the reality and its cognition, which has led to the formulation of off-the-mark 
foreign and security policies of the U.S., Japan, other East Asian countries, and, 
most importantly, China itself, that hinge on the cognition of the status quo ante. 
This paper will first explain Tsugami’s rationale why he challenges 
the mainstream discourse on China’s rise and, where deemed necessary, 
supplement other sources. Second, the analysis will distinguish between its 
long-term and mid-term implications to China’s external behavior, centered 
on the latter’s high policy relevancy for Japan’s national security concern as 
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related to the territorial question of the Senkaku islands. Tsugami himself 
does not mention the mid-term implications and would most likely disagree 
with them. Third, the paper will critically examine a major shortcoming of 
the Japan-U.S. alliance, as found in the text of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security 
Treaty. The study then will conclude with some policy recommendations so 
that Japan would be able to survive the mid-term challenge.
China’s Demographic Onus and its Socio-Economic Impact
Prediction is a difficult enterprise in social science, but demographic change is 
highly predictable given that the distribution of those already born in a national 
society is known while the size of those to be born in a foreseeable future can 
be easily estimated with the relatively stable fertility rate unique to the society. 
Demographic change, then, can serve as an extremely effective vantage 
point from which to comprehend its positive or negative impact on a nation’s 
economic power involving the long-term implications to military power. 
“Demographic bonus” and its antonym, “demographic onus” are 
two notable but quite often overlooked concepts whose implications have 
not been fully explored in international security studies. “Democratic bonus” 
is in common use, and termed alternatively as “demographic dividend”: the 
more working population of a nation vis-à-vis its total population, the fewer 
non-working dependents who need pension and other financial supports, 
and the more positive economic effect on the overall performance of its 
national economy.10 It is made possible by a relative increase of the working 
population which supports the retired senior citizens, consequently giving it 
more disposable income at the individual level and generating more effective 
demand and higher economic growth rates.
Contrarily, “demographic onus” involves negative economic impact 
due to the significant size of the non-working population vis-à-vis the working 
one which shoulders high financial burden per capita to support the former. 
As the income level increases, incentive to have many children will be 
significantly weakened, and the fertility rate will drop. This will effectively 
morph the pyramidal age structure of a society into an inverted-pyramidal one. 
But depopulation will advance slowly because the life expectancy lengthens 
and the mortality rate declines. The shrunk working population will be 
burdened to pay a significant part of the social security and welfare costs of 
the large non-working people who were born before such transformation, until 
they cease to exist. These costs lessen the working population’s purchasing 
power, effective demand, and the nation’s economic vitality, which will thwart 
significant military buildups. This means that the age structure of the total 
population, not its size, affects the level of living standard and welfare service.
A developing nation, therefore, has to put itself on a path to affluence 
both at the individual and aggregate levels during a finite transition period in 
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which a window of opportunity is open. Otherwise, it would suffer from strong 
“demographic onus” effect. Komine understands that Japan’s “demographic 
bonus” started in 1950 and ended in 1990,11 and the country took advantage 
of it during the 1970s and the 1980s when it continuously recorded very high 
growth rates. This helps explain why it has failed to grow over the last two 
decades. Similarly, he also identifies that China “demographic bonus” began in 
1965 and will soon finish in 2015.12 Certainly, China made a take-off in 1978 
under Deng’s reform and open policy, followed by a successful catch-up for 
the last two decades, especially uninterrupted double-digit growth rates for ten 
years until recently. Yet, Tsugami shows why China will surely face serious 
“demographic onus” before securing the ticket to affluence, suffering the so-
called “middle income trap”. 
Tsugami sees that China’s unlimited labor supply from the backward 
non-capitalist subsistence sector to the modern capitalist manufacturing one 
has already peaked out, known as “Lewis Turning Point”.13 Since beginning 
of the reform and open policy in 1978, China’s labor intensive industries have 
taken advantage of unlimited labor supply without the need to raise wages, 
and maintained its strong international competitiveness of manufactured 
products in export markets. This has generated a virtuous cycle of its rapid 
industrialization, growth, and capital accumulation. Chinese manufacturers, 
however, have recently experienced a sharp rise of wages, and are quickly 
losing international competitiveness vis-à-vis Southeast and South Asian 
countries where cheap labor is still abundant. These manufacturers hardly 
match those competitors in the capital- and knowledge-intensive sectors of the 
advanced economies, either. Obviously, China will no longer be able to play the 
role of a prime world factory. Without low-cost labor, the country now needs 
to achieve high productivity or added value through innovation, by making a 
transition from the current labor-intensive to a capital- or knowledge-intensive 
industrial structure, or from resource-driven to capital- or knowledge-driven 
growth.14 Will China be able to have sufficient financial resources to make 
investments in infrastructure, education and R&D that are essential to achieve 
such transformation?
Tsugami contends that China will be unable to make necessary 
structural change and then suffer the middle-income trap, on the grounds 
that the government and the state-owned enterprises control and possess the 
greater part of national wealth. The government has extraordinarily centralized 
economic power to control resource allocation through its broad and strong 
authority to grant permits and licenses, large budgets of the central and the 
provincial governments, and land grant authority. This means, therefore, 
that the government is both a market player and the referee at the same time, 
given its control over many state-owned enterprises in key industries, such as 
in finance, telecommunication, and heavy industry. This structure of China’s 
state capitalism has even been reinforced by massive post-Lehman Shock 
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government spending in public works, resulting in a significant relative decline 
of the private sector that is supposed to be a prime agent of innovation.15 The 
structure, compounded by the longtime residence registration system which 
virtually discriminate rural peasants against urban dwellers, blocks wealth 
redistribution and mass consumption of value-added goods and services 
that are essential to increase effective demand, especially at a stage in which 
basic needs are satisfied. Most probably, China won’t be able to achieve the 
necessary structural transformation without significant political and economic 
liberalization, which involves the termination of the communist dictatorship. 
This is because such transformation is very unlikely, given the regime’s firm 
rejection of any significant political and economic reform ever since the 
Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989.  
Thus, the advent of Chinese regional hegemon as a long-term prospect 
is not only Chinese mirage but also American and Japanese delusion. Today, 
we are simply reacting to the pre-Lehman image of China at its zenith, while 
the Chinese are acting with the sense of ungrounded over-confidence and 
euphoria. Rather, China will be the first country to face rapid ageing before 
becoming an advanced industrial country.16
The Long-term Path to a Geriatric Peace 
Based on the understanding that China is increasingly falling in the middle 
income trap, Tsugami sees little possibility of the country’s full-scale military 
aggression to the outside world over the long run, after the period 2025-2030, 
because the country will simply be unable to finance large military spending 
for that purpose.17 Certainly, those peasants migrating into urban centers may 
disregard their parents left behind in their agrarian home villages, but the 
traditional social norm on family, centered on a child’s moral responsibility 
to take care of his ageing parents, will be expected reasonably high among 
those who live with their parents in both urban and rural areas. Also, should 
the communist regime disregard the elderly and, with the discontent of their 
communities, face strong socio-political instability, it would be compelled 
to divert fiscal resources from external security to internal security. This 
possibility would be conspicuous in the latently explosive minority areas, 
especially in Tibet and Xinjiang. This reasoning is consistent with the existing 
literature in English on a geriatric peace that focuses on the trade-off between 
spending on the elderly and for defense.18 In addition to the trade-off, Libicki et 
al also point out that countries of low fertility rates are less interested in putting 
their children at risk than those with large families and thus surplus sons.19 This 
applies well to China having enforced the longtime one child policy. Isler also 
sees demographic changes will “increase Beijing’s risk aversion and constrain 
regional belligerence”.20 
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Certainly, as Libicki et al discuss, a surplus of Chinese men versus 
women—a result of the one child policy under which parents prefer boys to 
girls in choosing conception and abortion―means that many of them cannot 
marry. This may in turn constitute a potential source of the country’s socio-
political instability, because the government would be forced to put them into 
an army so that it can prevent them from forming large gangs.21 Yet, such a 
possibility is unlikely on the grounds that, to compete high-tech U.S. forces, 
China no longer pursues the possession of an over-sized army consisting of 
large conscripted soldiers, given the evolving emphasis on modernization and 
professionalization involving heavy investment in high-tech weaponry and 
platforms, especially for its navy and air force. Should China choose to build a 
large low-tech army with these cohorts, it will not exert any significant threat 
in the predominantly maritime theater of the Asia-Pacific region, except for 
those countries bordering China.
Thus, the U.S. and Japan will most probably be able to have a geriatric 
peace with China by default, but only over the long run. Then Tsugami presents 
the sense of cautious optimism in that the peace will be reasonably achievable 
by managing to weather the continued tension with China for the next ten years 
or so, without analyzing the extraordinary difficulty to do so over the critically 
important period.22 In the following analysis, the paper will stress on a good 
possibility of China’s mid-term bellicosity, despite the long-term prospect for 
a peace with China.
The Mid-term Bellicosity for Regime Survival
For the next ten years or so until it confronts serious “demographic onus” 
effect, China will have some significant room left to finance military buildups 
and operations.23 It begs the question if, with beefed-up military capability, 
China may become motivated to wage, among others, a war against the U.S. 
over the Taiwan Strait in which the U.S. forces may or may not enjoy strong 
rear-area and logistical support of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) or a war 
against SDF over the Senkaku islands in which SDF may or may not have 
combined operation with the U.S. forces.
The following discussion will focus on the possibility of a small 
and limited war against the Senkaku.24 This is because, given U.S. military 
dominance in the theater, a war over the Taiwan Strait demands a strong 
determination or a major miscalculation on the side of China, making it an 
unlikely but conceivable possibility.25 China at least faces great uncertainty to 
win, and at worst has to prepare for a miserable defeat. The result of the war 
also depends not only on the effectiveness of China’s military buildup focusing 
on anti-access and anti-denial capabilities vis-à-vis the U.S. forces but also on 
the level of U.S. commitment in defending Taiwan, which would be greatly 
influence by the health of the U.S. economy and the trend of the public opinion. 
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From a Japanese perspective, the Senkaku case makes sense because 
Japan does not have an official diplomatic relationship with the Republic of 
China nor an equivalent of the U.S. Taiwan Relation Act. Also, the Japanese 
Self-Defense Forces remains incapacitated under the existing defense-related 
laws to exercise the right of collective self-defense in general and executing 
combined combat roles and missions with the U.S. forces outside Japanese 
territory in particular. Certainly, in July 2014, the Abe Administration slightly 
loosened the longtime interpretation of Article 9 of the pacifist Constitution to 
authorize some limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense with the 
U.S. military in the case of a contingency directly jeopardizing Japan’s security. 
Yet, the administration has not yet revised the existing laws, particularly the 
positive lists of the authorized use of armed force.26 The Japanese government 
may extend rear-area and logistical support to the U.S. forces as policy choice, 
but it cannot directly defend Taiwan with the U.S. forces under the restrictions 
of the existing domestic and international laws, although doing so could be 
strategically desirable.
Here, it is important to note the power transition theory and the 
democratic transition theory. The former sees the strong causation that a 
rapidly rising power tends to challenge a dominant power in international 
power transitions, while the latter finds the causal link that a democratizing 
authoritarian state is prone to taking a revisionist external policy by 
manipulating nationalist sentiments at home, thereby diverting growing 
popular discontent with its authoritarian rule to such an external policy.27 With 
these theories’ reasonably good explanatory power, they may apply well to the 
case of rising China under the communist regime. For the last two decades, 
China has achieved a significant economic and military rise, involving 
U.S. relative decline and a power transition in which China would possibly 
challenge the declining U.S. hegemon. Concurrently, the Chinese communist 
regime confronts ever-widening income gap between the rich and the poor28 
and rampant corruption of party and government officials across the board.29 
As a result, the regime now faces snowballing popular discontent against it and 
hundreds of thousands of riots. The state of affairs is demonstrated by the fact 
that the regime has had slightly larger official internal security spending than 
defense spending for the last three years.30 Thus there is a good chance that, 
while manipulating popular nationalist sentiments at home, the regime would 
wage a war of aggression against the Senkaku Islands and thereby diverting 
growing popular discontent with its authoritarian rule. To be sure, this will 
constitute a major challenge to the Japanese-U.S. alliance.
Despite Tsugami’s optimism, therefore, China will most likely be more 
bellicose in the foreseeable future. This is because the communist regime will 
be increasingly cornered to struggle for survival due to a mountain of deepening 
political, economic, social, and even environmental predicaments. This also 
means that it will be compelled to divert snowballing popular discontent from 
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internal to external affairs, especially by a small and limited war against an 
existing or an imaginary enemy that it can win. Contrarily, the defeat in such a 
war might lead to igniting a series of massive anti-regime disturbances across 
the country, eventually terminating the life of the regime. At worst, despite the 
high level of interdependence with the U.S., Japan and the rest of the world, 
China will possibly attempt a last minute military-diplomatic offensive before 
it is completely in thrall to serious “demographic onus” effect.31
A Small War as China’s Diplomatic Instrument
Tomohide Murai, a professor at Japan’s National Defense Academy and Japan’s 
established leading academic expert on China’s military policy, emphasizes that 
China has proven record of employing a small war as its military-diplomatic 
instrument in peacetime, most typically in the context of its territorial disputes. 
Murai refer to Francis Watson, 32citing China’s core interests as those territories 
that were once under the name of the Chinese civilization. Those territories 
that were seceded to another country according to legitimate procedures of 
international law simply mean a temporary acknowledgement of the nation’s 
powerlessness.33 Then, this understanding on China’s irredentism is also 
reinforced by a detailed study of William A. Callahan on Chinese antique, 
modern and contemporary maps.34 The understanding is well shared by the 
Japanese informed pubic, particularly by the mainstream realist international 
relations specialists and practitioners specializing in East Asian security and 
China.
The regime’s ideological position on war— including class struggle, 
national liberation struggle, and inter-state war against an invader to protect 
state sovereignty — is, as Murai construes, the highest form of armed struggle 
to advance the popular interests. He understands that, according to today’s 
Chinese outlook on war, only a localized war is possible for the foreseeable 
future, given that only the U.S. and the Soviet Union used to be able to carry 
out a third world war and that U.S. power has been weakened, while, after 
the Soviets collapsed, Russia is not capable to compete with the U.S. Also, 
he suggests that the regime understands the limited scope and objective of 
localized war that continues for a very short period of time, most probably 
briefer than several days: China has to take the initiative of offensive operation 
to achieve the war objective by terminating the war before the enemy becomes 
able to exert its full military potential and before other major great powers 
interfere. In other words, today’s Chinese idea on war is characterized by an 
intensive all-out surprise attack under military high-tech conditions, not a war 
of attrition.35
Murai points out that the communist regime, immediately after the 
establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, made armed intervention 
in the Korean War, followed by its major attack on Taiwan and the armed 
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occupation of Tibet. In the 1960s, China initiated military clashes with the 
Soviet Union and India separately over its territorial disputes with them. In the 
1970s, China took Vietnam’s Paracel islands by force, followed by its invasion 
to the Vietnamese mainland with the pretext to impose “punishment” on the 
country. In the 1980s, China sunk a Vietnam munitions transport ship in the 
South China Sea. Furthermore, in the late 1990s, China seized a reef and a 
shoal under Filipino effective control. These cases demonstrate that, after the 
1970s, the Chinese communist regime has increasingly become less hesitant 
to wage a small war.36
Then, Murai focuses on the need to exert specific deterrence effect to 
China, given that general deterrence to a large-scale war, including extended 
nuclear deterrence, is hardly effective to prevent China from waging a small 
localized war. He refers to the case of China’s takeover of the Mischief Reef 
that used to be under Filipino effective control. China did not challenge it as 
long as the Philippines had the base lease agreement with the U.S. Having seen 
solid U.S. commitment to defending the Reef on the side of the Philippines, 
China was fully recognizant of unfavorable military power balance and 
preferred top-level Sino-Filipino diplomatic negotiation in 1974 and 1988 to 
shelve the territorial dispute. After the U.S. dislocated the base and withdrew 
its forces there in November 1992, the Filipino navy was left with a Second-
World-War-vintage destroyer as its only major surface vessel. Since its initial 
takeover in 1995, China has continued the military occupation of the Reef as 
fait accompli with the backing of military power.37 
Now that Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels have continually 
intruded into Japanese territorial waters centered on the Senkaku Islands 
without observing the requirements of innocent passage according to the 
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, sometimes coordinating the presence 
of China’s naval vessels in the area close to the waters, Japan cannot but be 
on alert to the conceivable possibility of a small war with China, especially 
in the context of China’s mid-term bellicosity. It is critically important to 
note that, given the longtime exclusive defensive policy since the Cold War 
period, Japan remains in the process of developing limited amphibious assault 
capability that is essential to recapture the Senkaku by itself should it be seized 
by China. Until the process is completed, therefore, only the alliance with the 
U.S. provides Japan with fully credible specific deterrence to possible China’s 
adventurism. Will the alliance work very well for this purpose? 
A Pitfall of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty
The U.S. appears to have made solid commitment to defending Japan under the 
bilateral mutual security treaty. Certainly, the treaty obligation is asymmetrical 
in that the U.S. is to defend Japan under attack while Japan agrees to provide 
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the U.S. with military bases and facilities on its soil without being required to 
defend U.S. forces if situated outside of Japanese territory. This is consistent 
with the restriction of Japan’s pacifist constitution that the U.S. imposed on 
it during the postwar military occupation: Japan cannot exercise the right of 
collective self-defense with U.S. forces that involves combined combat roles 
and missions. Yet, when defending its own territory, Japan’s SDF can fight 
together with U.S. forces by invoking the right of individual self-defense, on 
the grounds that an attack against U.S. forces in Japan constitutes one against 
Japan. (As discussed earlier, in July 2014, the Abe Administration loosened the 
longtime interpretation of Article 9 in a way to authorize some limited exercise 
of the right of collective self-defense. Yet, it is very difficult for Japan to fully 
exercise the right of collective self-defense due to restrictions built in the 
existing defense-related laws that are still based on the previous interpretation 
of the Article) 
But there exists a serious pitfall in the text of the mutual security 
treaty, which becomes evident when contrasted with the NATO Treaty. Article 
5 of the mutual security treaty stipulates:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its 
own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.
Article 5 of the NATO Treaty provides:
 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them  in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed 
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such 
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
There is a remarkable difference between the two: the U.S. shall fulfill 
its obligation to defend Japan “in accordance with its constitutional provisions 
and procedures”, while the NATO Treaty has no such conditional phrase 
attached. Certainly, the phrase equally applies to Japan that is straightjacketed 
by the restriction of the pacifist constitution in general and the existing defense-
related laws in particular that are still based on the previous interpretation of 
the constitution; notably, Japanese forces cannot defend U.S. counterparts in 
the areas surrounding Japan as long as they are situated outside the country’s 
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territorial waters and airspace. Under the evolving security challenge centered 
on possible China’s bellicosity, however, the certainty of U.S. commitment 
matters, at least from a Japanese perspective and, perhaps, for the durability of 
regional strategic stability.
This effectively means that, in the case of a Senkaku contingency, 
the U.S. president first has to satisfy the requirement of the constitutional 
provisions and procedures before carrying out armed intervention to defend 
Japan. This is in sharp contrast to automatic intervention under the NATO 
Treaty in which, if armed attack against a NATO member state occurs, the 
U.S. is automatically obligated to defend the country, although NATO’s 
collective fact-finding of armed attack may or may not take considerable time. 
No wonder, at the meeting held in New York on September 23, 2010, then-
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a revealing remark to her Japanese 
counterpart, Seiji Maehara, that Article 5 of the mutual security treaty applies 
to the Senkaku Islands.38 She did not say that the U.S. was obligated to fulfill 
its security commitment to defending the islands, though she simply reiterated 
the longtime U.S. position on the issue.
More specifically, the U.S. constitution empowers the Congress to 
declare war and the President to be Commander in Chief of the armed forces. 
This purports that, to wage war, the President first has to secure the consent 
of the Congress controlling war chest, though he can use the U.S. forces for 
intervention for a limited period of time within the existing budgetary funds. 
In fact, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 confines Presidential latitude for 
maximum 60 days. The successive Presidents have respected the Resolution 
in substance, without regarding it legally binding in that it infringes their 
constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. For instance, President George 
Bush obtained Congressional resolutions to support armed attack against 
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and Saddam’s Iraq, and, in 2013, President 
Barack Obama once expressed his intent to seek one prior to attacking Syria. 
Then, it is clear that a future President will most likely seek the consent of the 
Congress to defend the Senkaku islands under China’s attack. Without such 
consent, U.S. commitment to defending Japan will never materialize.
It is well known that the U.S. government will not take the side of 
any party over the sovereignty question of a territorial dispute, including the 
Senkaku case. Article 5 applies to the islands only because they are under 
Japan’s effective control. This virtually implies that it does not apply should 
Japan lose the control. In fact, Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary 
of State (2001-2005) under the George W. Bush Administration, wrote an 
article in a major centrist opinion journal with the largest monthly distribution 
in Japan, Bungei Shunjyu, in February 2011 that the U.S. will not be able 
to defend the Senkaku, if Japan does not defend it by itself and retains the 
control.39 From a Japanese perspective, therefore, it is annoying to see that 
the U.S. government has recently emphasized the importance of the freedom 
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of navigation, not the defense of islands under an ally’s effective control, 
as typically demonstrated by then-Secretary of State Clinton’s official press 
statement of January 22, 2011 in the context of the South China Sea.40 There 
is a growing sense of skepticism even within the foreign and security policy 
establishment, as demonstrated by the recent discussion of Ukeru Magozaki, 
former Director-General of the Foreign Ministry’s International Intelligence 
Bureau and Ambassadors to Iran and Uzbekistan.41 Left equivocal, Japan’s 
confidence in U.S. commitment to defending the Senkaku will be eroded, 
adversely affecting the bilateral alliance.
In this context, the Senate amendment to the 2013 Defense 
Authorization Act appears to have reduced some significant equivocality of 
the U.S. security commitment, exerting some additional deterrence effect on 
China. Looking closely, however, the amendment simply restates the current 
position, while reiterating Article 5 of the mutual security treaty. That is, the Act 
says that “while the United States takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty 
of the Senkaku islands, the United States acknowledges the administration of 
Japan over the Senkaku Islands” and that “the unilateral actions of a third party 
will not affect United States acknowledgement of the administration of Japan 
over the Senkaku Islands”. Obviously, the Act assumes Japan’s continued 
effective control over the islands.
Despite the abovementioned marginal improvements in the politico-
legal aspects of bilateral security relationship, U.S. and Japanese militaries 
have significantly played up their high operational preparedness, centered on 
the defense and recapture of a solitary island that implicitly supposes a Senkaku 
contingency. In summer 2012, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force and 
the U.S. Marine troops first conducted a month-long combined amphibious 
assault exercise on the U.S. islands of Guam and Tinian.42 In June 2013, SDF 
joint task force participated in the U.S.-led naval exercise and, as a part of it, 
carried out amphibious assault exercise offshore of San Diego with a Senkaku 
contingency in their mind. This was the first full-scale exercise of that sort on 
the continental U.S, which China strongly requested to cancel.43
Now, it is necessary to present policy recommendations how to 
control the negative effect of the pitfall as analyzed above.
Policy Recommendations
Hitherto, this paper has explored China’s demographic onus effect and its 
implications to Japan’s security, with a major focus on the Senkaku islands 
as the most likely flash point. The analysis has made it clear that Japan and 
the U.S. will face a geriatric peace with China by default over a long run, 
probably after 2025-2030, but that China will most likely present the mid-
term bellicosity for regime survival. More specifically, China is anticipated 
to employ a small war as peacetime military-diplomatic instrument to divert 
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snowballing popular discontent by satisfying the popular sense of unground 
overconfidence and euphoria.
As a focal point to cope with such bellicosity, the paper has examined 
the certainty of U.S. commitment to defending the Senkaku Islands, under the 
mutual security treaty. It has discovered that U.S. armed intervention is not 
automatic but contingent upon Congressional consent, the condition that is not 
required under the NATO Treaty. Left equivocal, Japan’s confidence in U.S. 
commitment to defending the Senkaku will be eroded, adversely affecting the 
bilateral alliance.
Certainly, the Senate recently extended moral support to Japan in 
direct confrontation with China by amending the 2013 National Defense 
Authorization Act, and the U.S. and the Japanese militaries played up the high 
preparedness of their amphibious assault capabilities to exert more deterrence 
effect on China. Yet, these measures seem insufficient to stop China’s 
excessively provocative paramilitary and military activities in the East China 
Sea in general and in the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands in particular.
To safeguard Japan’s security under the Japan-U.S. alliance, the 
following are specific policy recommendations.
First, the Defense Authorization Act has to annually include a 
statement similar to that of 2013 referring to U.S. security commitment to 
Japan, including the Senkaku, under the bilateral mutual security treaty. This 
practice must continue at least for ten to fifteen years. Should China display 
stronger bellicosity, the statement has to be more than the current wording 
that Article 5 shall apply to the Senkaku. Instead, to enhance effective specific 
deterrence effect on the country, the Congress had better state that the U.S. 
shall defend the Senkaku in accordance with the mutual security treaty.
Second, Japan and the U.S. have to increase the level of operational 
preparedness, especially in amphibious assault capability, by having regular 
combined exercise, both in frequency and scale. Again, this practice must 
continue at least for ten to fifteen years. Should China be more hostile and 
bellicose, such exercise has to be carried out in the vicinity of Okinawa in order 
to play up the operational preparedness and exert higher deterrence effect. 
Now the above prescription stands increasingly better, given China’s 
abrupt establishment in November 2013 of an Air Defense Identification 
Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea that claims its jurisdictional control in 
contravention of international law44 and the country’s confirmed training for 
short and sharp war in the Sea against Japan.45
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